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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
The field of human communication theory is broad and interdis­
ciplinary in character. Investigators in the area draw upon many fields 
in efforts to describe and elucidate the processes involved in man*s 
communicative activities. This is as it should be, for communication 
not only makes human society possible as we know it, but, in a sense, 
society is the result of myriad communicative exchanges. Looked at in 
another way, the processes of inter-human communication are the counter­
part of human, symbolic thought. In view of the above, it is small 
wonder that questions concerning the nature and function of language 
have become of increasing importance tq many areas of professional in­
terest, including linguistics, philosophy, psychology, sociology, poli­
tical science, rhetoric, and group dynamics— to name but a few from a 
long list.
The purpose of the present work is to set forth an approach to 
the study of one aspect of human communicative activity. The questions 
to be explored in the following pages have to do with the nature of 
human understanding. The central question to be examined is: what is
there about human, symbolic understandings which makes them capable of 
being communicated?
At this point it might be well to make clear that the scope of
-1-
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the present study does not extend to all of man*s communicative behav­
ior. The communication of aesthetic or moral values, for example, is 
deliberately excluded from consideration, as well as any understanding 
of things or events in the world that is not mediated symbolically.
Thus the whole area of non-symbolic, gesturally communicated meanings 
between individuals is not treated.
In the present work, attention is centered on one dimension of 
man’ s communicative behavior: the communication between individuals of 
symbolically structured conceptual frameworks. The problem is further 
limited to situations in which one individual is presumed to have a 
complexly structured conceptual framework (i.e., an interconnected sys­
tem of concepts by which he orders and coordinates his experience) and 
the intention of communicating this framework to another individual.
The relationship between human understanding and conceptual 
frameworks to be developed in what follows is that an individual’s use 
of a conceptual framework constitutes his understanding. The term 
"human understanding," as it will be employed in the present work, is 
to be thought of as a psychological system by means of which some por­
tion of an individual’s experience is ordered and made a part of his 
working conceptualization of reality. The nature of such understandings 
will be one of the principal problems to be explored in the following 
chapters. However, bearing in mind that most of the ideas being used 
are to be developed in later chapters, attempt might still be made to 
give some more explicit notion of the type of communication to be ex­
amined later. Such an attempt follows below.
Communication, as it will be discussed in the present work,
-3-
should be thought of as the transfer of understandings via the communi­
cation of conceptual frameworks. In accordance with the above stated 
relationship between understandings and conceptual frameworks, communi­
cation as the transfer of understandings might be formulated as follows: 
individual A has an understanding which consists in the use of a parti­
cular conceptual frameworkj when communicated to individual B, B? s un­
derstanding of A may be taken as his achieved ability to use the con­
ceptual framework communicated by A. Viewed in this way, it can be 
seen that the result of the communicative exchange is to effect a change 
in B’s ways of ordering the world— or at least to increase the ways in 
which he may choose to order his understanding of the world. Further­
more, since as was stated we may regard an individual’s ordered under­
standing of the world as a psychological system, we may define communi­
cation as the effect of a message upon the psychological system of a
receiver. A revised definition of communication which includes this A
? \last view of the process would be: communication is the transfer of 
understandings via the communication of conceptual frameworks which 
result in a reordering of a person’s psychological system or understand­
ing.
The usefulness of the above formulation, of course, depends upon 
our abilities to unravel and solve problems concerning the nature of 
understanding when it is conceived of in this way. Fortunately, what 
seems a very useful approach to the problem of dealing with understand­
ing when it Is thought of as the use of conceptual frameworks is to be 
found in the area of the philosophy of science. The approach consists 
in efforts on the part of writers in the area to explicate the scientist’s
-4-
understanding of the world. Three waiters, Stephen Toulmin,'1' David
2 3Hawkins, and Ernst Cassirer, have worked out notions of the nature
of scientific understanding in terms of strikingly similar conceptions
as a symbolic restructuring of relevant concepts. Scientific discovery
as explicated by Toulmin, Hawkins and Cassirer has as its result nothing
more than ordinary human understanding, describable as a comprehension
of a particular conceptual framework.
At this time it might be well to insert a comment on the approach 
to the general subject of language usage employed in the present study. 
As already indicated, no pretense is made of treating definitively the 
whole subject of language usage. It is the writer’s goal in the fol­
lowing Chapters to create a synthesis of views on the subject of what 
gets communicated in the communication of conceptually realized under­
standings. The writers discussed in the following chapters are sel­
ected because their views seem capable of being fitted into the kind of 
synthesis desired, and because, although far from being of a piece, 
their views seem in varying degrees compatible with the desired synthe­
sis. It thus might be said that the fitting together of selected views 
on language usage is as much a function of the desire of the writer to 
see them synthesized as it is a function ©f some commonality of views 
and interests on the part of the writers selected. The efficacy of
■̂ Stephen Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science (lew York: Harper 
and Row, Publishers, 19537"̂
2David Hawkins, The Language of Mature (Sam Francisco: W.H. 
Freeman and Go., 1964).
JErnst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (Hew Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1944), and The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (Three Vols., Hew 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), I*
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this approach must of course depend upon whether or not the obtained 
synthesis aids in an explanation of the communication of complex, con­
ceptual frameworks.
Turning now to an attempt to make clearer how some better under­
standing of the nature of the scientist* s working conceptions could aid 
in setting forth a workable view of communication, we might briefly com­
pare our usage of our own everyday formulations of things with the scient­
ist* s usage of theoretical formulations. As will become clearer in a 
later discussion of scientific discovery, the scientist creates or sees 
the relevance of an already present structured way of seeing things, 
which is then applied to the world. His structured way of seeing things 
constitutes his theory. The scientist is trained to be very self-con­
scious in his use of theoretical formulations and is sophisticated con­
cerning the relations between his theories and observational facts. We, 
in our everyday usage of culturally transmitted and individually created 
formulations of things are not so self-conscious about relations between 
them and the occurrance of events in the world which could be taken as 
confirming them. We do not, to use a view expounded by Toulmin (and 
one that will receive considerable attention later), commonly see con­
firming instances as evidence that our working conceptualizations of 
things can be applied in these cases.^ On the contrary, we commonly 
see them as just another instance of t!the way things are.'*
We might note that there is often a great difference in the 
nlevel of reality11 attributed to working formulations on the part of
T̂oulmin, 112-113.
scientists and on the part of people in their everyday lives. let, in 
both cases the individuals involved are making use of conceptually 
structured ways of looking at things— i.e., conceptual frameworks, and 
in each case this usage goes to make up an understanding of the world.
A later discussion of the individual1s total understanding as put for­
ward by Kenneth Boulding'’ will help support the view that our total 
understanding is a composite of many conceptual frameworks as they have 
been discussed thus far, loaded with valuations and that sometimes they 
are only partial insights and inferences. In the present work, interest 
will center on the completely realized conceptual frameworks within a 
person*s total understanding, minus their valuative loading. To attempt 
more would be to go beyond the scope of the present study.
What is sought is a general notion of understanding to use in 
explicating what gets communicated in an exchange between two people.
The relative clarity of the scientist*s understanding gives insight 
into the nature of understanding in general and, therefore, is useful 
to examine. If a notion of what is communicated is developed, it is 
assumed that we may then turn to an examination of how it is communi­
cated with some better, more workable notion of how to deal with this 
latter problem.
We might now turn attention to possibilities of relating the 
conception of communication as the transfer of understandings to other 
approaches to the subject of information transfer. Other investigators 
concerned with human communication have recognized the need for some
5Kenneth Boulding, The Image. (Ann Arbors University of Michigan 
Press, 1956).
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explanation of what goes on within sources and receivers of information. 
They have also recognized the need for an explanation of what constitutes 
the meaningful content of messages. However, rather than attempt to 
describe and discuss all of these alternative approaches to these pro­
blems, it seems better to show how the present approach conforms to wiiat 
seems to the writer to be the most closely related current statements 
by theorists of meaning on the subject of information transfer. In each 
case reasons will be given for departing from these approaches.
The proposed conception of communication is not completely with­
out precedent in the area of theorizing about human communication. How­
ever, it does seem to be a conception that has not received very exten­
sive treatment. Upon examination it can be seen to conform, although 
somewhat loosely, to the philosopher Charles Morris* conception of the 
pragmatic aspects of language usage. As Morris defines it, ** * Pragma­
tic s* is that portion of semiotic which deals with the origin, uses, and
6effects of signs within the behavior in which they occur.” In the 
following chapters the concern will be almost exclusively with symbols 
and not signs. However, once this distinction is made clear, the area 
of language usage set forth by Morris as the pragmatic dimension seems 
adequately to describe the area of present interest. Furthermore, as 
Charles L. Stevenson has pointed out, it is possible to identify the 
pragmatic aspects of language usage with the psychological reactions of
7the users of the language. In other words, pragmatics, in Stevenson*s
Ĉharles Morris, Signs. Language and Behavior (lew York! Prentice- 
Hall, Inc., 1946), 219.
7Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (Mew Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1944), 42.
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version, is concerned with the effects of messages upon the psychological 
systems of the participants of a communicative exchange. This latter 
formulation of pragmatics, it should be noted, fits quite well with the 
previously given formulation of communication. To reiterate, in the com­
munication of conceptually structured understandings, we are concerned 
with the effects of messages upon a psychological system which is the 
receiver*s structured understanding of the world.
As stated, the pragmatic dimension of language usage has received 
relatively little attention from theorists. What Morris provides is 
more a statement of where such a conception would fit within a total 
framework than a detailed description of what such a conception would be 
and now it would function. Morris* treatment is further limited by the 
fact that he attempted to make his science of s@Ed.otic so broad. His 
efforts to treat all linguistic behavior as sign behavior might account 
for his attempt to reduce symbolic behavior to sign behavior— i.e., some­
thing explainable in terms of sign behavior— and make it treatable in 
terms of a contiguity-reinforcement theory of learning. As Charles 
Osgood, et. al., have pointed out, Morris* attempt to anchor semiotic in 
behavioral learning theory runs into the danger that the response dis­
positions he invokes to explain symbolic behavior may serve as "a mere
&surrogate for * idea* without further explication.'*
It might also be noted that psychological systems, of which our 
use of conceptually structured understandings is an example, have the
C.E. Osgood, G. Suci, and Pi Tannehbaum, "The Logic of Semantic 
Differentiation," Psycholinguistics. S. Saporta, ed. (lew Tork: Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), 286.
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status of mediating constructs—-i.e., they are hypothetical inner states.
With the advent of Watsonian Behaviorism and the widespread adoption of
an operational methodology and orientation to research, inner states fell
into disfavor and have only recently become once again scientifically
respectable. However, inner states as mediating constructs have proven
ever more useful to behavioral scientists of late— even though, as
Cronbach and leehl have stated, they are often couched in an operational
9phraseology which belies their usage. Its lack of scientific respect­
ability might account for theorists* reluctance to investigate the nature 
of understanding. The regained status of inner states, i.e., meanings, 
response tendencies, habit family hierarchies, second signal systems, ex­
citatory potentials, attitudes, etc., as mediating constructs is an in­
teresting subject in itself, but one that has received considerable at­
tention elsewhere. The reader interested in pursuing the subject further
is referred to discussions by Cronbach and leehl,lulon Wells,and
12Charles L. Stevenson.
Even when employing mediating constructs in treating meaning, 
one finds a prevalent tendency to deal with aspects of meaning rather 
far down the conceptual ladder, i.e., in terms of the relation between 
meaning and referent. Theorists taking this approach, for example,
9L. Cronbach and P.E. leehl, "Construct Validity in Psychological 
Tests," Psychological Bulletin. LII, Hay 1955, 300.
10Ibid.. 281-302.
11Hulon Wells, "leaning and Use," Psycholinguistics. 269-283. 
■̂ Stevenson.
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Charles Osgood, et. al., and Soger Brown and Don E. Dulaney, do not 
treat meanings that are represented by symbols as having a created, con­
textual nature, i.e., as being meaningful within the structure of a con­
text. They seem far too concerned with finding its "elements" and its 
ways of coining to be associated with a referent. For contiguity-rein- 
forcement theorists the meaning of a symbol seems little more than an 
arbitrary connection between a label and a referent which is made be­
cause of temporally contiguous reward.
The level of meaning commonly treated by a contiguity-reinforce-
ment theory of symbolization will be dealt with in the following chapters
15 16in a fashion expounded by Joseph Church and Erast Cassirer. In the
views of these theorists, meaning at this level is first simply the 
infantas reaction to a non-linguistic interpretation of its environment. 
Later symbols come to represent these meanings.
Here it might be well to take note of the fact that the usage of 
condeptual frameworks as they are presently employed is at least three 
stages away from meaning at the first non-linguistic level. In the mean­
ing hierarchy to be developed in the following chapter, there are first 
such non-linguistic interpretations, then symbols, concepts, and finally 
conceptual frameworks.
13G.E. Osgood, et. al., 300.
■̂ Eoger Brown and Don E. Dulaney, "A Stimulus-Response Analysis 
of Language and leaniBg,,, Language Thought and Culture. Paul Henle, ed. 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958), 49-98.
^Joseph Chureh, Language and the Discovery of Reality (Mew York: 
Random House, 1961).
16Cassirer, Essay . . . and Philosophy . . .. I.
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The individual1s use of symbols and concepts in conceptually 
structuring his experience is of vital importance to the present approach 
to the study of the communication of understandings. let it seems to 
be a methodological limitation of a contiguity-reinforcement approach 
that it restricts the theorizer to a referential orientation to meaning, 
is Osgood et. al. admit in their discussion of semantic differentiation, 
the broader scope of the theory of the semantic differential was obtain­
ed at the sacrifice of a direct tie-in with the learning theory concep-
17tion of meaning which was desired to support it. It would seem that 
theorists treating meaning with-a contiguity-reinforcement theory have a 
very long road to travel before reaching a vantage point where they will 
be able to deal with the use of symbols in creatively treating experi­
ence to obtain new conceptual orderings of the world. As Heinz Werner 
and Bernard Kaplan have stated,
It seems to us that it is well-nigh impossible to account 
for symbol-realism in terms of a contiguity-reinforcement 
theory of symbolization, that is, in terms of a theory 
that reduces symbols to signs. leither animals nor humans, 
insofar as they respond to entities qua signs, confuse the 
sign with what it indicates or foreshadows; no conditioned
dog treats a beU or buzzer as if it were of the same sub­
stance as the food it signalizes or indicates; no normal 
man opens his umbrella to protect himself against clouds 
or thunder as signs of rain.1
The referential function of symbols is thus seen to be only a part of
their nature; their representational function is something that will be
expounded upon in later discussions following the lead of Cassirer.
Thus far a conception of communication as the transfer of under-
17Osgood, et. al., 300*
ISHeinz Werner and'Bernard Kaplan, Symbol Formation (lew York;
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963), 36.
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standings has been put forward. The position has been taken that the 
process might be fruitfully viewed as one involving, not the direct com­
munication of understandings, but rather the communication of conceptual 
frameworks which, in their comprehension and incorporation into the psych­
ological system of the receiver, amount to an understanding on the part 
of the receiver.
To meet problems encountered in explicating the process in this 
suggested way, it has been proposed that the use of conceptual struct­
uring as it is employed in science and is discussed by three philosophers 
of science might serve in elucidating what gets communicated. The sug­
gested usage of conceptual frameworks has been shown to conform in some 
ways with Morris» development of the pragmatic dimension of language 
usage. However, it has also been shovm that there is a certain amount 
of difficulty in dealing with the pragmatic dimension of language usage 
in the way that Morris advocated. An alternative method, following 
the conceptions of language development advanced by Church and Cassirer, 
has been suggested. In the following chapter, a meaning hierarchy will 
be developed in which symbols are created out of non-linguistic meanings, 
then concepts and finally conceptual frameworks.
CHAPTER WO
THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURING OF EXPERIENCE THROUGH SYMBOLS
In this chapter we will be concerned with the general subject of
language acquisition as a necessary stage in the individual1s creation
of conceptual realities. The developmental psychology of Joseph Church
will be drawn upon up to the point of the attaining of symbolic meanings.
At this point attention will be turned to a discussion of the subject by 
2Cassirer, and continued to the desired conception of symbolic systems of 
inter-related concepts.
Meaning Prior to Language
In his discussion of the subject, Joseph Church begins with the
3assumption that the child is first a perceiver of meaning. The child
first perceives only personally meaningful objects.
Those objects and those properties of objects, stand out 
which offer some relevance to the child in terms of pro­
mise of threat or concrete action . . . .  The child per­
ceives only personally meaningful objects, and ... what 
he perceives is not so much the objects as their meanings. 
Developmentally and microgenetically, meanings precede 
objects in perception.̂
Church terms perception at the above stage “physiognomic perception."
1Church, Language and the Discovery of Reality.
2Cassirer, Essay and Philosophy.
3̂Church, 4-5»
4Ibid.
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The child perceives things, but he perceives them in terms of their tfphys-
5iognomic-meaning qualities rather than their objective attributes.n An 
object’s objective properties, such as size, shape and color, Church con­
tends, are submerged in its general physiognomy and do not emerge as isol-
6able perceptual dimensions until almost age two.
Physiognomic perception is not something restricted to the child’ s
first perceptual experience. Church further contends that this type of
perception continues into adulthood.
It is only when we scrutinize an object analytically or 
jmdgmemtally or contemplatively that we cease to perceive 
physiognomically. Unless we have some reason to analyze 
an object we may live with it for years without ever not­
ing many of its readily perceptible objective properties.'
The presence of physiognomic perception, it might be noted, is probably 
less noticeable than it might be by virtue of the fact that few of the 
things man views have not at one time or another been symbolically treat­
ed, i.e., incorporated into a reality which is a symbolic formulation of 
things. Furthermore there is the fact that, as Church points out above, 
to think about an object, i.e., to contemplate it, is to cease to regard 
it physiognomically. Another fact which will be important in future dis­
cussions of language usage should be noted in Church* s above'discussion.
It can be seen that, initially, the child experiences the world directly. 
an object is first simply an "it.” This idea is one that will be useful 
later, following the treatment of the subject by Cassirer.
The meanings which the child learns through physiognomic perception 
are put together in terms of a '’schema.'* Church states, "The baby’s
5Ibid. 6Ibid. 7Ibid.. 6.
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experience— what he leams— is consolidated as knowledge, and the most
8fundamental form of knowledge is the schema.” Church defines the schema
both logically and psychologically. Logically, a schema is an "Implicit
9principle by which we organize experience.” By this he means that, log­
ically, schemata incorporate both recognition and implicit classification, 
plus generalizations from experience (e.g., bottles, toys, etc., all fall 
one direction, down), all of which are implicit until made explicit through 
symbolic or linguistic formulation. Church further says,
Psychologically . . . we become sensitive to the way things
are constituted and act, so that we perceive the environment
as coherent and orderly, in ways that the adult can make ex­
plicit as principles but that, for the baby, exist only in 
the sense that here is the world and things are under pretty 
good control.
From the above definition, it can be seen that Church* s psychological use 
of schemata is that of a descriptive term. Schemata are used in sorting
out the environment. As we have seen, they are learned in terms of physi­
ognomic perception— at least at first— and together they go to make up
the child*s stock of non-symbolic meanings with regard to the world.
6
Church goes on to say that schemata can be either very general or
very specific. The most general and all-pervasive schema is our orienta-
11tion to a "broad spatial and temporal and situational framework.” Our 
sense of the enduring identity of physical objects is embodied in this 
schema. Schemata continue to develop and change throughout life, and they 
will be a subject of particular interest later on in a discussion of gen­
eral orientational frameworks. At present our interest in them centers in 
the fact the child’s preverbal meanings are incorporated in schemata. The
8Ibid., 36. 9Ibid. 10Ibld., 36-37. i:LIbid., 37.
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schematization of objects occurs with learning their enduring identity-
12their constancy of size, shape, color,and brightness. Space is schem­
atized pragmatically in terms of direct experience, while time is similar­
ly dealt with in sorting out the routine occurrences of the day, feeding 
time, bath time, etc.
Up to this point we have been concerned with showing that the child*s 
preverbal experience is one of meaningfully sorting out the environment, 
that he comes to the learning of language with meanings for which langu­
age will provide a new mode of expression. However, in this chapter we 
are not directly concerned with the child’s learning of language. That 
subject has already been adequately covered by Church in his own ejqaosi- 
tion of the subject. His views on the child’s non-linguistic world were 
discussed because they will make more readily understandable the views of 
Cassirer on the general subject of the development or acquisition of lan­
guage in what follows. To accept Cassirer’s position, it is necessary to 
conceive of the individual as in some measure meaningfully perceiving the 
world, and, in Church’s view, the child is engaged in just such meaning­
ful perception from the start.
Symbolic Structuring
For Cassirer, the key to the understanding of man lies in his use 
of the symbol. The view of man set forth by Cassirer in his Essay on Han 
and in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms is that man experiences little 
direct confrontation with the worldj man’s view of the world is one that 
is symbolically mediated. In the man who has had the benefit of culture,
12Ibid., 41.
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there is a world of symbolic meaningfulness which is then available to use
by the individual in understanding both himself and his culture. Han
lives in a new dimension of reality:
Man has, as it were, discovered a new method of adapting 
himself to his environment. Between the receptor system 
and the effector system, which are to be found in all an­
imal species, we find in man a third link which we may 
describe as the symbolic system. This new acquisition 
transforms the whole of human life. As compared with the 
other animals, man lives not merely in a broader reality; 
he lives, so to speak, in a new dimension of reality.
In Cassirer*s view the power of man’s thought begins with the dis­
covery that '’everything has a name.”^  What he is referring to is the 
fact that everything man talks about is represented symbolically, that is, 
in terms of symbols whose distinguishing characteristic is not their ex­
plicitness of reference, but their preciseness of meaning and the versatil­
ity they allow in using that meaning. Symbols are tools of synthesis and 
creation because, through them, meanings initially created through an 
interaction with the world of experience, can be given stabiltiy and per- 
nance by means of the act of giving them a name. Later, by virtue of be­
ing treated symbolically, these meanings can be represented through the 
use of the same name-symbols. What we will direct our attention to now 
is the question of how such symbols come to be.
The symbol, in Cassirer’s discussion of it, is made possible be­
cause of a sensed similarxty between sxtuations* The possibilxty of giv­
ing a name rests on the individual’s concentration upon some property of 
situations, some sensed similarity between them which, by naming it, gives
■̂ Cassirer, Essay. 24*
•̂ Ibid.. 34-35.
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rise to a symbol.1** In Cassirer’s words,
The beginning of thought and speech is [jthatj ... on 
our own inititive we draw certain dividing lines, effect 
certain separations and connection by virtue of which 
distinct individual configurations emerge.16
To recall something from Church’s discussion, the child first experiences 
the world directly, and, as a result of such interaction, non-linguistic 
meanings are developed. What Cassirer is talking about in the above 
quoted passage might be thought of as seeing a similarity between two 
such non-linguistic meanings. When some similarity is perceived between 
two situations, thought changes through this experience from an experi­
ence of "it” to something about an "it.” let this new meaning would be 
lost if it were not given permanence through the act of giving it a name. 
Each name-symbol thus formed is a schema, a principle for organizing simi­
lar experiences. The essence of symbolism is the use of names to desig­
nate perceived meanings created through an interaction with the world, 
leaning arises through interaction, and, once the interaction is over, 
all that is left is the meaning, preserved if fixated through time by a 
name. From this it follows that the meaning named, no more than the now 
irretrievably past interaction, is to be found in the world.
Perhaps we can better see what is happening in terms of an example 
which seems compatible with Cassirer’s position, and seems also to contain 
at least some of the essentials of his thoughts on the subject. Let us 
suppose then, that we are in the presence of primitive tool-using man. At 
the stage of language development with which we are concerned, man has 
learned to designate certain of his tools by name. What would be the
^Cassirer, Philosophy. 283-284. ^Ibid.. 280.
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meanimg of the name for the tool to its user? Cassirer emphasizes the
fact that, to the primitive mind, things are thought of in terms of their
use, i.e., in terms of their utilitarian, functional properties. And, as
Church has pointed out, to the child of today even, a car is first "some-
17thing that you ride in.” Thus, we might suppose that if the tool were 
used as a hammer its name would mean something like "the thing I hit with" 
or "the thing I beat with," etc. Similarly, if the tool were used as a 
scraper, its name would mean something to the effect of "the thing that 
I scrape with.”
Suppose now that some man loses one of his tools or that one is 
broken and he decides to replace it. Should he now produce a tool like 
the first one in its functional properties and give it the nan® of the 
old tool, we would have something of the essence of symbolisms a name that 
has been transferred from one concrete, particular situation to another. 
The name, formerly meaningful in only one situation, has been carried 
over and applied to another situation. low suppose that the name for 
this tool becomes with time applied to other tools that are like it in 
some of its functional properties, those that have been perceived to be 
relevant in using its name. The name would then stand for what we are 
free to think of as the class of such tools, and its meaning would be in 
terms of some common functional property of those tools.
What has been suggested through the above example is that symbolic 
meanings develop in terms of some noted characteristic of many particular 
situations. Their application in any particular situation henceforth be­
comes a designation of some instance of sob® class of situations. It is
^Church, 173.
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the "designational" quality of the application of symbolic meaning which 
is referred to as asserting that symbols allow us to talk about the world.
There is an underlying assumption running throughout the discussion 
thus far which it might be well to make explicit. This assumption is that 
men have not only similar experiences of the world but that they also have 
similar insights concerning their experiences. In no other way could the 
above account claim to be an explanation of the genesis of shared mean­
ings. That is, for the resulting symbolic meanings to be shared ones, 
there must have been a sameness in the sensed similarities between situa­
tions on the part of the individuals involved. The designational quality 
of symbols, when used, entails the assumption of referring to' meanings 
which arose through previously shared insights.
One further point should perhaps be made, in the example given 
above the transfer of meanings was made in terms of use. However, it is 
certainly possible to see that other transfers of meaning in terms of 
some property of situations but not in terms of use of things are also 
possible. The important transfer, or maybe more correctly, the essence 
of the transfer is that of created meaning.
Turning now to a discussion of concepts, it can be seen that, from 
the very beginning, the symbol has something of;the nature of a concept. 
Symbols designate, initially, a sensed similarity in the experiences of 
two or more situations while concepts group together symbolic meanings 
as subordinate members of a class in terms of some shared characteristic 
of meaning. Thus to distinguish symbols from concepts seems more a mat­
ter of degree than of kind. Looked at from another angle, concepts are 
expressed in symbols; we invent a new symbol to stand for a concept. let
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there are reasons for keeping both terms and in attempting to, in some 
measure,differentiate between them, itt the same time, we should recog­
nize that it is only a verbal shorthand to speak of concepts rather than 
of symbols as concepts.
That the formation of concepts is an almost identical process to
that of the formation of symbols is made clear by Cassirer in showing
that the process cannot be accounted for solely in terms of abstraction.
The process of abstraction can only be carried out with re­
spect to such contents as have already been defined and desig­
nated, which have been classified in language and thought. But 
how, we must now ask, do we arrive at this classification it­
self? What are the conditions of that first primary formation 
which is effected in language and which provides the foundation 
for all subsequent and more complex syntheses of logical thought? 
... To penetrate to the ultimate source of the concept, our 
thinking . . . must seek those factors of synthesis and analysis 
which are at work in the process of word formation itself, and 
which are decisive for the ordering of all our representations 
according to specific linguistic classifications.
In Cassirer*s view, the formation of a concept begins with the ap­
prehension of a particular common property of symbolic meanings.
Before language can proceed to the generalizing and subsuming 
form of the concept, it requires another, purely qualifying; 
type of concept formation. Here a thing is named not from the 
genus to which it belongs, but on the basis of some particu- 
lar property which is apprehended in the total intuitive con­
tent.
From the above it can be seen that a concept is not simply abstracted
meaning; the concept is in none of the particular symbolic meanings from
which it is supposedly taken. As Cassirer says,
If, after having fixed and named several contents as such, we 
group them into the form of a series, we seem, in so doing, to 
have postulated a common characteristic which is manifested in 
all of them, yet in each one with a specific d i f f e r e n c e . 2 0
^Cassirer, Philosophy. 280. ~^Ibid.. 283. Q̂Ibid.. 282
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There is in Cassirer’s account an assertion to the effect that sym­
bols make human, symbolic thought possible. We might pause new to examine 
that assertion more closely. It isgnot the trivial point that, without
i
symbols, thought would not be "symbolic" in nature. The use of symbols
provides not only the nature of human thought, but, in Cassirer’s view,
is essential to the fact that man is able to reflect on aspects of form
and meaning as we are wont to do. Reflection requires the ability to
isolate ideas, relations, or concepts for concentrated attention. For
this, it is necessary that such ideas be separable from the mere stream
of consciousness. This problem is characterized by Cassirer as follows:
All consciousness appears to us in the form of a temporal pro­
cess— but in the course of this process certain types of "form” 
tend to detach themselves. The factor of constant change and 
the factor of duration tend to merge.21
The linguistic forms (e.g., conceptual frameworks) which man creats
"as products of language, myth and art, and in the intellectual symbols of 
22science" seem to have a sort of existence in the mind independently of
their being referred to by consciousness at any particular moment. This
is our experience of them. let, as Cassirer says, "At the same time in
order to be manifiested, to exist ’for us*’ they mast be represented in 
23this stream." The problem is that linguistic formulations as products 
of thought must be referrable to by thought, i.e., brought into the temp­
oral stream of consciousness— this is the character of symbolic reflection. 
Cassirer asserts that, "In the creation and application of the various 
groups and systems of symbolic signs, both conditions are fulfilled."2̂
His meaning seems to be that linguistic formulations, as products of man’s
21Ibid.. 110. 22Ibid. 23Ibid. 24Ibid.
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thought, have the character of being "referable to" by virtue of the fact 
that they were in the first place constructed in terms of symbolic mean­
ings free in their meaningfulness from any particular external reality.
They are representable in the stream of consciousness by virtue of this 
same fact, i.e., their meaning does not depend on anything in the stream 
of consciousness. The meaning of "refer to" in this caseois the fact that 
their meaning has been previously created and can now be drawn upon. When 
a conceptual thought is represented in the stream of consciousness, atten­
tion is focused on these previously constructed meanings. Of course, it 
should be noted that this is only a description of how it seems to work 
in Cassirer*s view, not an explanation of consciousness.
With the attainment of the ability to reflect symbolically about 
the world, nan started on a path leading to ever greater sophistication
in his conceptions of the world. It is with these symbolic meanings, or
primitive concepts, which finally emerge as culturally evolved formula­
tions of things that man* s understanding of the world has been built. If 
our own understanding of the world is more complex and comprehensive than 
would seem to be provided by such a process of attained meaning as that 
suggested above, it is because our language has culturally evolved to 
higher levels of abstraction and categorization of our expreience of the 
world, and the power of our language in its availability to use in symboli­
cally structuring an understanding of that experience has gained accord­
ingly. In speaking of this increasing power of language, Cassirer says,
The ascent to higher levels of abstraction, to more general 
and comprehensive names and ideas, is a difficult and labori­
ous task . . . .  Human speech evolves from a first compara­
tively concrete state to an abstract state . . . .  In many 
languages we find an abundance of color names. Each individ­
ual shade of a given color has its special name . . . .  The
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same holds good for the category of number: Different num­
erals are required for referring to different classes of ob­
jects. The ascent to universal concepts and categories, 
therefore, appears to be very slow in the development of hu­
man speech; but a new advance in this direction leads to a 
more comprehensive survey, to a~better orientation and organi­
zation of our perceptual world.
The power of man*s thought then., lies not in his explicitness of 
language except in a very special sense; for the adequacy of a descrip­
tion to be accepted it must be explicit. Yet it seems even more impor­
tant, when we are dealing with a subject of considerable complexity, 
that our description be given at a level of abstraction sufficiently 
high to allow use of comprehensive terms which include details without 
particular reference to any but the most prominent of them. Otherwise, 
we have no comprehensible description but a mass of incomprehensible 
details. Human meaning, symbolic meaning is not one of details, but 
rather one which is applied and within which details fit. This is what 
Church and Cassirer mean by a symbolic, and, on higher levels of ab­
straction, conceptual structuring of an individual?s world.
The nature of the symbols man uses, their freedom from any par­
ticular external world of experience, allows man the freedom to sym­
bolically restructure, shift and see things differently. And this, in 
the writer1s understanding of Cassirer, is his view of what symbolic 
thinking is. The problem solving process found in the higher animals, 
and learning, apparently available to all animal life, gains freedom 
and power almost beyond comprehension in man alone when symbols sub­
stitute for, and allow the individual to create new, symbolically struc­
tured conceptions of the world and its possibilities.
25cassirer, Essay. 135-136.
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Having reached a stage in our discussion where we are talking
about conceptual creativity, attention can now be turned to the use of
this capacity in creating conceptual frameworks. In discussing the case
of Helen Keller, Cassirer is attacking "associationist" explanations of
such things as perception and symbolic functioning. At this point,
Cassirer asserts that,
If the sensationalist theories of perception were right, If 
every idea were nothing but a faint copy of an original sense 
impression, then the condition of a blind, deaf and dumb 
child would indeed be desperate. For it would be deprived 
of the very sources of human knowledge; it would be, as it 
were, an exile from reality. But . . . .  as the case of 
Helen Keller proves, man can construct his symbolic world 
out of the poorest and scantiest of materials.
At this point Cassirer states his own position on the role of symbols
in the creation of human worlds of thought:
The thing of vital importance is not the individual bricks 
and stones but their general function as architectural form.
In the realm of speech it is their general symbolic function 
which vivifies the material signs and "makes them speak."
Without this vivifying principle the human world would in­
deed remain deaf and mute. With this principle, even the 
world of a deaf, blind and dumb child can become, incompar­
ably broader and richer than the world of the most highly 
developed animal. '
A definition of conceptual frameworks can now be given as a 
created "way of seeing things" that is structured in terms pf symbolic 
meanings. It is a relational way of placing meanings in a certain con­
figuration that is meaningful in and of itself. Another way of putting 
the point would be to say that the meanings used in such conceptual 
structures take their preciseness of meaning either wholly or in part
26Ibid.. 35-36.
2?Ibid
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from the context in which they appear. Symbolic meanings in context 
form a whole which is greater than and is not simply the sum of its 
individual meanings.
In the next chapter we will attempt to see something of the use 
of conceptual structuring on the part of scientists in making a dis­
covery. Following this a similar search will be made in one type of 
human problem solving— that kind which could be presumed to be aided 
by a knowledge of relevant concepts. We will then return to the sub­
ject of the general function of conceptually structured formulations 
of things in making possible what Cassirer has referred to as “the 
human world of space and time.”
CHAPTER THREE
TIE USE OF SYMBOLIC RESTRUCTURING IN 
SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
Science is thought of by many as the systematic discovering of 
orderliness in nature. As Cohen and Nagel point out in discussing 
Mill’s canons of discovery, the oft-made claim that experimental methods 
are capable of leading to the demonstration with complete certainty of 
universal, invariant relations has long been regarded as resting on 
the assumption that nature is uniform.-*- Yet to emphasize the "lawful­
ness" of nature without at the same time considering the creative con­
tribution of the scientist in discovering that lawfulness is perhaps 
to miss something vital to an understanding of the nature of scientific 
enquiry. In the following discussions of scientific discovery, Stephen 
Toulmin and Ernst Cassirer take pains to emphasize the conceptual 
creativity on the part of the scientist in discovering what lawfulness 
is to be found in nature. In a later discussion by David Hawkins, not 
only the conceptual creativity of the scientist but also the orderliness 
of nature is explored. Hawkins puts forward the interesting thesis 
that our knowledge of nature might be the result of some kind of
M̂orris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and 
Scientific Method (New Yorkt larcourt Brace and Co., 1934), 26?ff.
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interaction between our investigation of nature on the one hand, and 
the order in nature on* the other.
Discovery in Science as Sew Ways of Regarding Old Phenomena
What does it mean to say that a scientist has made a "discovery”
of some lawfulness in nature? Was "it" there unbeknownst to us until
he stumbled across it? What does such a "discovery** amount to really?
Stephen Toulmin has suggested that we should not only ask these questions,
but also what "sort of demonstration will justify us in agreeing that,
whereas this was not previously known, it now can be regarded as 
2known." Toulmin*s point is that scientific discovery ought not to 
be confused with the kind of discovery that takes place when an explorer 
discovers a new river or a botanist discovers a new variety of flower; 
what the scientist actually discovers is a new way of regarding already 
familiar phenomena.
Toulmin goes to considerable length to present his argument as 
fully as possible. In the following brief synopsis covering only the 
main lines of the argument, no attempt is made to argue for the correct­
ness of his views. They are presented as an at least plausible account 
and one fitting science as it has come within the range of the writer*s 
experience.
Toulmin asks that we consider the possible formulation of the 
scientific hypothesis to the effect that light travels in straight 
lines, or the principle of the rectilinear propagation of light, as it
SToulmin, Philosophy of Science. 1? ff.
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is known in the field of geometrical optics. As might be expected, 
Toulmin directs our attention first to the phenomena to be accounted 
for: shadows, changes in the distribution of light and shade as the
sun moves or as we move a lamp, changes in the size of shadows depend­
ing (or seeming to depend) on the distance the shadow-producing object 
is from the lamp, and so on.
low, as before the introduction of the idea of light traveling 
in straight lines, it certainly would have meant little to speak of 
light as traveling. As Toulmin goes to some pains to make clear, both 
of the key words, "light” and "traveling,” in the discovery are given 
new uses in the very statement of that discovery. Prior to the adoption 
of the notion of light traveling in straight lines, the phenomena it 
explains remain things primitive, simply to be accepted as "the way 
things are." In Church*s system, they are physiognomically perceived. 
After the discovery the phenomena become something "explained;" they 
are part of a symbolically structured interpretation of experience, 
low they are the effects of something hitherto never referred to as 
"light."
The "light" now referred to is clearly not the sun or a lanp or 
illuminated areas; rather, it is something inferred from them and such 
phenomena as changes in shadows. This something to which we have given 
the label "light" is to be thought of as something that is traveling, 
but again the notion of traveling has been extended by the scientist 
in stating his discovery. In the sort of situations with which the 
physicist is concerned, it ought to strike us as odd to speak of any­
thing as traveling in the usual sense of the word. The physicist
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talks of light traveling whether shadows or light patches are moving
or stationary. As Toulmin says,
The discovery that light travels in straight lines was not, 
therefore, the discovery that, where previously nothing had 
been thought to be, in any ordinary sense, traveling, there 
turned out on closer inspection to be something traveling—  
namely, light: to interpret the optical statement in this
way would be to misunderstand its whole point.3
What the physicist has done, Toulmin argues, is to take the notions,
the concepts of "light" and "traveling” and use them to provide a new
way of regarding familiar phenomena.
What justifies us in looking at familiar phenomena in a new way
is to be determined in terms of the adequacy of, first, how well our
new way of seeing things can be made to account for the facts— i.e.,
provides an "understanding of why they are as they are."̂ - Secondly,
it is to be found in new questions it prompts us to ask, questions
which formerly would not have occurred to us to ask. Toulmin says:
Coming to think about shadows and light-patches in a new way, 
and in consequence to ask new questions about them, questions 
like "Where from?," "Where to?" and "How fast?," which are 
intelligible only if,one thinks of the phenomena in this new 
way.-’
All of these questions, it should be noted, can be asked without ever 
troubling with the question of what it is that is traveling.
Finally, Toulmin cautions against thinking of scientific dis­
coveries as simply summing up or stating more compactly a series of ob­
servations; a scientific discovery is not "a plain generalization of
^Ibid., 20.
%bid., 29.
 ̂Ibid.. 21.
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the observations we write down in our laboratory notebooks.”  ̂ The dis­
covery has the nature of inventing a conceptual formulation of things
7within which observations may be fitted and thereby ê qjlained.'
Discovery in Science as Symbolic Restructuring 
The views of Toulmin find ready support in the philosophical 
work of Cassirer. What Toulmin has termed finding new ways of regard­
ing old phenomena, Cassirer refers to as symbolic restructuring. Both 
accounts involve the creation of a conceptual framework for seeing the 
’’facts*' of the world in a new way. As Cassirer puts it,
All systems of classification are artificial. Mature as 
such only contains individual and diversified phenomena. If 
we subsume these phenomena under class concepts and general 
laws we do not describe facts of nature. Every system is a 
work of art— a result of conscious creative activity.®
Cassirer, like Toulmin, points to the fallacy of regarding scien­
tific discoveries as depending in any simple way upon accurate observa­
tions. In speaking of the emergence of chemistry from alchemy he writes,
It was by no means the lack of empirical evidence that for 
many centuries obstructed the progress of chemical thought 
and kept chemistry within the bounds of pre-scientific con­
cepts. If we study the history of alchemy we find that the 
alchemists possessed an astounding talent for observation.
They amassed a great bulk of valuable facts, a raw material 
without which chemistry could scarcely have been developed.
But the form in which this material was presented was quite 
inadequate. When the alchemist began to describe his obser­
vations he had no instrument at his disposal but a half-mythi­
cal language, full of obscure and ill-defined terms. le 
spoke in metaphors and allegories, not in scientific concepts.'
6Ibid.. 64.
7Ibid.
8Cassirer, Essay. 209. 
9Ibid.. 215.
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For both Toulmin and Cassirer the process of scientific discovery
calls for creativity on the part of the discovering scientist. It is
not the mere apprehending of facts that leads to discover, but the cast­
ing of them into a form that is understandable. In Cassirer1s words,
For this decisive step which leads from the merely apprehen- 
dable to the understandable we are always in need of a new 
instrument of thought. We must refer our observations to a 
system of well-ordered symbols in order to make them coher­
ent and interpretable in terms of scientific concepts.10
It is the creation of such ’’well-ordered symbols” which is symbolic re­
structuring} it is the result of such symbolic restructuring that is a 
discovery.
Discovery in Terms of Evolving Categories of Thought 
It was the view of Kant that the human mind is possessed of cer­
tain categories of thought; i.e., ways of organizing the world of sense 
into knowledge. According to Kant the human mind imposes on received 
sense data the a priori categories of substance (i.e., permanent things 
with qualities), causality, magnitude and so on. The philosopher David 
Hawkins, while agreeing with much that Kant had to say, takes issue 
with his view that these categories are ”mind-dependent and fixed, once 
and for all.”^  Hawkins insists that we must regard man as a being who 
has evolved in this world, one who has learned and is capable of con­
tinuing to learn from this world. For Hawkins, then, the categories of 
Kant are not fixed; they have changed and will continue to change with 
man’s increasing knowledge of and changing views of the world.
1QIbid.. 217.
^Hawkins, The language of Mature. 254.
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The argument presented by Hawkins is a rather complex and in­
volved one since it is given in terms of a fusion of views from thermo­
dynamics and information theory. The results of that argument, however, 
are very similar to the views of Toulmin and Cassirer already presented 
— at least insofar as they apply to the subject of discovery in science. 
In Hawkins' words, "What we call science is constructed and tested out
of human experience. But it is constructed, it is an artifact; its
12mode of construction is human, and it bears the mark of style."
According to Hawkins, there is a certain necessary correspondence
or relationship between man's perceiving mind and the world. With this
thought, of course, we come to the view that there is order in the
world, but still do not take seience as the passive recording of order
in the world. Hawkins greatly emphasizes the fact that the human mind
is both greatly complex and highly structured and that part of the
mind's function is to act as an information processing center. From
one side of the question of older, the perceiving of order is a result
of and made possible by a highly structured and ordering mind. However,
Hawkins argues against the idea that sensory input from the world
"can, in any intelligible sense, be said to receive form solely from
some synthetic capacity of intuition in accordance with a priori organ-
13izing principlesFor one thing, there must be order in the world 
because "the only sensory input that is formless is sheer random noise,
12'Ibid.. 252.
13Ibid.
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14and with sack input nothing is perceived at all.” ^
The position of Hawkins might appear to conflict with the earlier
formulations of Cassirer and Toulmin to the effect that the discovering 
of order in nature is, in Cassirer*s words, ”a result of conscious 
creative activity.” However, closer inspection reveals that these 
positions are not at variance at all. 411 three writers recognize 
that our experience of the world is not random in character. But where 
Toulmin and Cassirer have emphasized the creative contribution of the 
scientist in formulating a conception of that order, Hawkins, for pur­
poses ©f his own, is emphasizing the orderliness in nature by which 
the scientist is guided. Man, Hawkins asserts, is an organized per- 
ceiver who has evolved in an organized world and who makes sense of 
that world because his categories of thought as well as his means of 
perceptually receiving information from the world have an evolutionary 
history. But this is an argument that will be developed in what follows.
To appreciate something of the force of Hawkins’ argument, we
must consider what he calls a third stage in evolution. This develop­
ment bears a striking similarity to what Cassirer speaks of as man’s 
acquisition of a new, symbolic link and a new dimension of reality. 
However, where Cassirer is concerned with accounting for the develop­
ment of a symbolic dimension of consciousness, Hawkins’ main program 
is to find a link between this symbolic dimension and current knowledge 
of physiology. He finds this link in the notion of information theory.
Hawkins outlines three stages of evolution. In all three he is 
concerned with an informative interaction between organism and environment
■^Ibid., 254.
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and the transfer of this information to succeeding generations of the or­
ganism. At the first stage of evolution delineated there can be only gen­
etic transmission of any informative interaction between organism and en­
vironment, and this is small indeed in any one generation. There is no 
learning at this stage. The biochemical mechanisms of the responsiveness 
of the organism to its environment is encoded in the genetic record and 
passed on, but "if the species learns, it does so only by becoming a new 
species."^
Such organisms are suited to live only in simple surroundings where 
food is abundant, but what of the organism forced to live in a complex and 
variable environment? The genetic record, already tremendously complex, 
can only be extended so far; at some point it can no longer be extended.
At some point in the distant past a learning component evolved as an addi­
tion to the organism’s makeup, and this, in Hawkins’ account, marks the 
second stage in evolution. However, the information gained by the organ­
ism’s interaction with the environment is not genetically transmitted and 
dies with the organism. Even when some of the information needed for liv­
ing is incorporated into the environment, as in bee hives, this limitation 
remains unremoved.
In the ancestory of man, however, Hawkins asserts that this 
upper bound has ceased to be effective. "The third stage of evolution 
is marked, within a single genus, by the appearance of a new mode of 
evolution, non-biological and more rapid by orders of magnitude than 
the biological mode." ® This new mode of evolution, linguistically
15Ibid.. 271. l6Ibid.. 276.
-36-
mediated, cultural evolution, is manifested both externally and inter- 
17mally. Man not only lives in his environment, he remakes it and con­
trols it. He is able to do this because he has a linguistically medi­
ated understanding of both himself and of his place in the world as 
well as of the world itself. The internal side of cultural advance is 
the creation and sophistication of a human world of symbolically struc­
tured experience. Hence, we find in Hawkins* account the thesis of 
Cassirer; namely, that the individuals comprehension of the world and 
the people about him, and of himself, is a linguistic process of sym­
bolic structuring.
We are now ready to return to our discussion of the process of 
scientific discover, for, in Hawkins* view, one of the things evolved 
and culturally transmitted through culture is the world view of that 
culture; within it and basic to it are its categories of thought. The 
categories of thought are a cultural achievement evolved out of a re­
finement of analogies. The refinement of analogies might be compared 
to a refinement of tools. As Hawkins at one point sayss
There is a continuity in the development of knowledge, just
as the tools we make are limited by the tools we already 
have, the tools to make them with. In neither case can we 
make arbitrary innovations, and in neither case are limited 
to a mere replication of what we already have.l®
At this point we can see a very close correspondence between the thoughts
of Hawkins and Cassirer if we view analogies as symbolic structures and
17'Hawkins* terms for the above aspects of cultural evolution are 
the "extemalization" and "internalization" of culture.
^Hawkins, 245*
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the refinement of analogies as symbolic re structuring.
Hawkins stresses the fact that the categories, as ways of organ­
izing experience, have a long history, a cultural, evolutionary history, 
and that, as such, they reflect the cumulative effects of the interaction 
between man’s culture and the world. There is a necessary correspondence 
between man’s ways of regarding the world and the world itself— although 
not a necessary knowledge of the world. Han’s analogies are couched in 
a sort of ”language of nature.” By this Hawkins means that we have 
”these categories of knowledge and not others because these facilitate
flows of information as others would not; we evolve the channels to fit
19the signal source, of nature.”
it the risk of oversimplifying things, it would seem that what 
Hawkins is saying could be boiled down to a conception of the scientist 
as limited by the conceptual tools he brings to an investigation of 
nature, ©n the one hand, and the ”facts” of nature on the other. Hawkins’ 
regard of this state of affairs is an optimistic on© because the former 
limitation is subject to cultural development and sophistication. In 
Hawkins’ view then, the process of scientific discovery is one involving 
the refinement of analogies whose use results in statements which more 
and more closely approximate true statements about the world
19Ibid.. 254.
CIAPTEE FOUE
A FUETHEB CONSIDERATION OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 
IN TEEMS OF SI1BOLIC EESTEUCTUBING
It will be recalled that Cassirer puts forward the thesis that man 
has gained the ability to think about the world and apply conceptual 
frameworks to the world through the development of an abstract symbol 
system, i.e., language. There must be an intermediary stage in which 
there occurs the symbolization of experience before human, symbolic 
thought can take place. Yet, once this symbolization of experience is 
underway, the meaning of terms man uses does not depend on concrete sense 
data, i.e., the '’sensible” world need not be present to be referred to.
Man is free in his thought processes from any concrete, particular extern­
al reality. Symbolic meaning is a created structure of man’s mind trans­
mitted through language, and it is entirely in terms of such meanings 
that the understanding of the world which is uniquely man’ s is structured.̂ "
Cassirer* s contention is that what distinguishes human thought is 
that man has developed and has exclusively available to use by his con­
sciousness a symbolic environment, with it an ability to think symboli-
"̂Cassirer* s emphasis upon the symbolic nature of man’s thought 
might seem excessive unless it is remembered that his treatment of the 
subject is one that excludes physiognomic pereetion as part of man’s view 
of the world. In other words, Cassirer is concerned with contemplative, 
judgmental and analytic thought which, as was noted in Church’s discussion, 
indicates the cessation of physiognomic perception.
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cally about the world, and finally to conceptualize the world symbolical­
ly and thus understand: it. We are therefore free, within the framework 
of Cassirer1a account, to differentiate between a symbolically concept­
ualized understanding of the world which is man*s alone and other, non- 
symbolically structured understandings— attainable by at least the higher 
animals. In this chapter we shall be looking for those features of ©mr 
own, uniquely human understanding distinctive from the rest of the animal 
world.
We might begin by postulating a structured awareness of the world 
in all of animal life, in the higher animals, a consciousness which is 
the result of mental activity. In man, through his use of the symbol, 
this activity has become something more. Beginning with the assumption 
of an active, consciousness in man, we might turn to questions concern­
ing the possible activities of the mind. How is it active? What does it 
"do"?
For one thing, we now can be fairly certain that it does more than 
simply combine elements by "association.” In discussing the possible 
combining of elements of consciousness, Cassirer points out that the con­
cept of association is "broad enough to cover all relations that could
possibly exist in consciousness; but by its very breadth it obscures their
2specific character." As he goes on to say,
Association fails to distinguish between relations of the most 
diverse quality and modality. "Association" means the fusion 
of elements into the unity of the ego or the object, into the 
whole of a thing or a sequence of events— into a series whose 
members are connected by the criterion of cause and effect and 
into a series whose members are connected by the criterion of 
"means” and "ends."3
%assirer, Philosophy, 102. ^Ibid.
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Cassirer’s point is that by failing to take into account the system of fun­
ctions which consciousness achieves, "the diversity of paths by which con­
sciousness arrives at its synthesis is totally obscurred."̂  At the same 
time it gives the character of consciousness as that of a passive per- 
ceiver of the world. In his view the mind is constantly engaged in the 
structuring of information sensorially received from the environment and 
in seeking more information from that environment. In Churchfs system, 
the above activity is what he refers to as schematization.
In Cassirer’s discussion of relational thought, he begins by mak­
ing the point that the awareness of relations is not restricted to humans; 
animals have been trained in ehoiee situations and show a great ability in 
choosing among objects on the basis of the correct choice being nearer 
than, darker than, larger than, and so forth. The difference between ani­
mals and men in problem solving, he states, is that the animal is tied to 
particular situations wherein he can solve the problem in terms of things 
present; man, however, is not so limited to things concrete and present.**
His examination of the evidence leads Cassirer to assert that "high­
er animals are capable of that process which Hume in his theory of knowl­
edge terms making a ’distinction of reason.’" Yet he goes on to say:
But all the experimenters engaged in these investigations have 
also emphasized the rarity, the rudimentariness and the imper­
fection of these processes . . . .  If there are certain traces 
of a distintio rationis in the animal world, they are, as it 
were, nipped in the bud. They cannot develop because they do 
not possess that invaluable and indeed indispensable aid of 
human speech, of a system of symbols.®
Man shares with the higher animals then, his creative, active comseiousi-
ousness, but, through a greater capacity or something we might loosely
fofbid.. 103. Ĉassirer, Essay. 38-39* ^Ibid.
term intelligence, he has gained the use of a tool of thought beyond the 
reach of the rest of the animal world. The symbol, as Cassirer has as­
serted is the key to the understanding of man, for it is the use of the 
symbol that has freed man*s consciousness from things experienced dir­
ectly. The relational thought of nan requires a complex system of sym­
bols wherein relations can be structured and considered in themselves.
We do find in man a special type of relational thought which 
has no parallel inthe animal world. In man an ability to 
isolate relations--to consider them in their abstract meaning 
has developed. In order to grasp this meaning man is no long­
er dependent on concrete sense data, upon visual, tactile, kin­
esthetic data. He considers these relations ’’in themselves*’1?
From Cassirer’s account, it would appear that the distinctive 
features of human thought and understanding that we seek are to be found 
in the fact that man possesses the tool of conceptual thought which al­
lows him to consider a problem in its abstract relational aspects. In 
Church’s system, the schema is made explicit through being treated symbol­
ically. Or, to refer back to the previous discussion of scientific dis­
covery, it can be seen that reaching such a discovery involves something 
more than can be accounted for in terms of perceptual acuity— i.e., in 
terms of astute observation of the facts as presented visually. The 
scientist’s solution involves the structuring of phenomena into a new 
form, a working conceptualization which can then be applied back to the 
observational '’facts’1 to see whether they are accounted for or not in 
terms of this new formulation of things. The power of man’s thought de­
pends upon the power of the conceptual tools he can bring to the task and 
these in turn are dependent on cultural advance in sophisticating language
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and individual, human ingenuity in using that language.
Symbolic Versus Perceptual Problem Solving 
Some of the contentions that have been raised thus far in the pre­
sent discussion of human understanding will be both clarified and support­
ed through a discussion of human, conceptual problem solving. However, to 
provide some needed contrasts between animal and human problem solving, 
some discussion of the problem solving efforts of animals will also be in­
cluded. Comprehension of the presently advocated view of human understand­
ing almost necessitates distinguishing it from animal"understanding. To 
that end the efforts of the present section are bent.
Kohler1s studies of insightful problem solving in chimpanzees pro­
vide excellent material for the discussion of animal problem solving.
When properly considered we can see in them some of the points of Cassirer* s 
just recounted discussion of relational thought. In Kohler’s studies, it 
is possible to see the seeking of new relationships within the visual 
field as the source of insight.
In his discussion of insightful solutions Kohler seems to imply, 
that, when confronted with a problem solvable through~a rearrangement of 
objects, prior to such actual rearranging there occurred a perceptual re­
structuring of the situation. In the single box problem, for example, a 
lure was hung out of reach with a box present but not under the lure. All 
of the animals tested made repeated attempts to reach the lure by jumping, 
even jumping from the box in its unmoved position. However, Sultan, whom 
Kohler came to regard as most intelligent of the group, soon ceased jump­
ing, paced up and down, and suddenly stood in front of the box. Then, 
moving it quickly beneath the lure, he mounted It, jumped, and secured
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8the Imre. The contention the writer wishes to assert here is that before 
moving the box beneath the Imre, i.e., prior to actually rearranging the 
physical environment, Sultan shifted his regard of his perceptual field.
He ’saw” the box beneath the lure and what such a positioning of it would 
result in with regard to his attempts to reach the lure. This perceptual 
restructuring (or what Kohler and others have termed a ’’Gestalt”), the 
writer is arguing, was his insight. let we should not stop here but go 
on to notice that his insight was one that penetrated the nature of the 
problem he faced and was a solution of the problem. Dare we dignify his 
regard of the unmoved box, his, as has been argued, "seeing” it beneath 
the lure with the term "hypothesis"? Possibly we can, for we have in 
Sultan’s insightful solution of the box problem all of the elements of 
scientific discovery save one, symbolic restructuring or manipulation in 
terms of relevant concepts. The necessary tie-in with the previous dis­
cussion of scientific discovery lies in the fact that his insight amount­
ed to an understanding of the problem situation. It was a general, rudi­
mentary type of understanding, and a non-symbolic one to be sure, but an
9understanding nevertheless.
laving in some measure accounted for an animal’s understanding of 
a problem situation in terms of non-symbolic relational thought or per­
ceptual restructuring, let us turn to some analogous studies in human
%. Kohler, "The Mentality of Apes," following Woodworth and 
Schlosberg’s discussion in "Problem Solving and Thinking,” Experimental 
Psychology.(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1954), 820.
%t might be argued that there is no reason to insist that Sultan’s 
understanding was a non-symbolic one. However, the point is that concept­
ual thinking need not be invoked to explain his insightful behavior. As 
the following discussion endeavors to show, this is not the case with re­
gard to human understanding.
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problem solving. Because investigators have long been aware of the im­
portance of concepts to the processes of human problem solving, problems 
have been devised whose solutions entail the use of some widely held con­
cept. In Kaier*s two-string problem, for example, the needed concept is 
that of the pendulum.10 The subject is introduced into a room,bare except 
for two strings hanging from the ceiling, a chair, a piece of wire, and a 
pair of pliers. The solution involving the use of the concept of the 
pendulum is for the subject to tie the pliers to one of the strings and 
set it swinging— i.e., make a pendulum out of it, then, holding the other 
string, grasp the swinging pendulum at its nearest point. The problem is 
made more difficult by the fact that a wire is present and pliers are gen­
erally regarded as a tool used on wire. The concept "tool," reinforced 
by the wire, is in the way of the concept "weight" which in turn can only 
be seen as relevant in terms of the concept "pendulum." A conceptual 
solution requires that, in accordance with the concept "pendulum," the 
concept "tool" be replaced by the concept "weight." When the problem is 
solved as above, then we have what we can truly identify as a symbolic 
restructuring of the situation into one in which one of the strings is 
seen as a potential pendulum and the pliers are seen, not as a tool, but 
as a weight for it.
Mow let us return to our discussion of the distinction between per­
ceptual restructuring and symbolic restructuring. Suitan? s solution to 
the box problem required a restructuring of the perceptual field. . The
10N.R.F. Haier, "Reasoning in Humans, II," following C.E. Gsgood»s 
discussion in "Problem Solving and Insight," Method and Theory of Experi­
mental Psychology (New York5 Oxford University Press, 1953), 632-633- -
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human, symbolic solution to Maier* s two-string problem, however, requires 
not only a restructuring of the perceptual field, but its restructuring 
in terms of a known concept previously not seen as relevant to the situa­
tion. To use Toulmin*s formulation, the "notion*1 of the pendulum must be 
applied to this particular situation. Again, the elements of an attained 
understanding are before us, but new, uniquely human elements have been 
added: the combination of perceptual and symbolic elements (i.e., concepts) 
into a new kind of understanding, a symbolically structured, conceptual 
way of relating the elements of the problem.
Still let us pause to consider that the above argument for a sym­
bolic restructuring is in some ways open to attack. A solution could 
have been reached without any symbolic restructuring. The subjects could 
have seen that what was needed was a weighted, swinging string and also 
seen the pliers as a means of achieving this without ever even possessing 
the concept of the pendulum. Their solutions would then have been like 
Sultan*s solution to the box problem in every respect. As John B. Carroll 
has pointed out, human beings do solve problems without having knowledge 
of how a physicist would describe their behavior in terms of scientific 
concepts:
The concept of the lever is utilized by the farmer when he 
pries up a stone, even though he may not verbalize it with 
either the words lever or pry. In such cases it might be 
thought that we could dispense with the notion of concept 
and assert that the response of the farmer is a direct learn­
ed response to a particular kind of problem, namely a stone 
which is hard to move, nevertheless the fact that the farmer 
may exhibit considerable planful behavior— going to get a 
crowbar, digging a socket for it, and finally moving it in a 
certain direction— suggests that there is more than a direct, 
overt response to the problem situation. .On the other hand, 
the fanner might be hard pressed if someone asked him to
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explain how even a not-very-strong child can move, with a 
crowbar, a stone ranch heavier than himself.11
As Garroll notes, to dispense with the notion of concepts, it is necessary 
to account for the fanner*s "planful behavior." In this connection, it 
should be considered that the farmer* s behavior seems completely analogous 
to the behavior of Kohler*s chimpanzees after they had mastered a parti­
cular method of solution. Having learned to use sticks, they would look 
for a stick in solving a problem. Neither the farmer*s nor the chimpan­
zee* s behavior is a direct response to the problem situation, but a learn­
ed response to a particular kind of problem. The main difference ip in 
the farmer*s greater intelligence, which results in his "knowing" that a 
crowbarlis appropriate to the solution to this type of problem, while the 
chimpanzees, having learned to use sticks, would try to use them even in 
a situation in which their use would be wholly inappropriate.
The point to be emphasized here is that while human beings can and 
often do solve problems in terms of what we have termed a perceptually 
structured understanding, a symbolic solution to a problem is not of this 
nature. To put the point more strongly, to have a concept requires being 
able to characterize it symbolically. This use of concepts, and the un­
derstanding it makes possible, is limited to the human species. Viewed 
in this way, it can be seen that the farmer who uses a crowbar as a lever 
no more has the concept "lever" than Sultan, in putting two sticks together 
to reach a lure has the concept "extension." Such non-symbolic problem 
solving behavior seems adequately accounted for in terms of perceptual 
structuring and learning without ever invoking concepts. "Concepts," as
tl.B. Garroll, Language and Thought (Englewood Cliffs, lew Jerseys 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), 84-85.
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they are treated here, then, are symbolic concepts. It is only in so far 
as man has achieved a symbolic conception of problem situations and a sym­
bolically structured, conceptual way of relating the elements of problems 
that he has succeeded in advancing away from the type of thinking engaged 
in by the apes. For adequate illustration of this latter point however, 
we might turn to a more typically human problem, one presented in verbal 
terms and solved in symbolic concepts.
A classic experiment by K. Duncker provides a good example in this 
instance. Students were given difficult, technical problems and requested 
to think aloud as they solved them. They were to express even the fool­
ish notions that occurred to them, and they could ask any questions they 
wished. In one such problem the subjects were given the problem of rid­
ding a patient of an inoperable stomach tumor without damaging any tissue 
except that of the tumor. They were further informed that rays were avail­
able which destroyed organic tissue at sufficient intensity. One subject’s 
sequence of proposals ran as follows:
(l) Send rays through the esophagus. (2). Desensitize the heal­
thy tissue by msans of a chemical injection. (Experimenter:
False analogy; no injection is in question.) (3) Expose the 
tumor by operating. (4) One ought to decrease the intensity of 
the rays on their way; for example — would this works turn the 
rays on at full strength only after the tumor has been reached.
(5) One should swallow something inorganic (which would not al­
low passage of rays) to protect the healthy stomach-walls. (Ex­
perimenter: It is not merely the stomach-walls which are to be 
protected.) (6) Either the rays must enter the body or the tu­
mor must come out. Perhaps one could alter the location of the 
tumor— but how? Through pressure? no . . . (9) Move the tumor
toward the exterior. (The experimenter repeats the problem and 
emphasize s, I?which de stroys at sufficient intensity.n) (10) The 
Intensity ought to be variable.(Compare 4.) (ll) Adaptation of 
the healthy tissues by previous weak application of the rays. 
(Experimenter: How could one decrease the intensity of the rays 
en route?) (13) Reply: Somehow divert . . . diffuse rays . . . 
disperse . .. stop! Send a broad and weak bundle of rays
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through a lens in such a way that the tumor lies at the 
focal point and thus receives intensive radiation. (To­
tal duration about half an hour.)
In the above example what was an hypothesis becomes a solution because it 
not only reaches the goal (in this case the elimination of the tumor), 
but is seen to be a consistent path from what is given to what is required. 
In Duncker’s experiment the crucial concept was convergence. However, 
this concept could only be seen as relevant after the subject had fully 
considered the concept of the ray with its capacities of doing limited 
damage depending on the strength of its application. Then ways were open 
for examination of means of concentrating the strength of the ray at the 
point of the tumor and no other, and thence to the utilisation of the con­
cept of convergence.
The distinction sought between understandings as perceptually struc­
tured insights and symbolically structured ones should now be clear. In 
the former, as Cassirer has argued, there occurs the perceptual restruc­
turing of elements in terms of things present— possibly benefitting from 
past learning. In the latter there:" is a reformulation of the problem into 
a system of well-ordered concepts that provides a ’’way of seeing” these 
elements in a way which meets the requirements of a problem in terms of 
its givens. Such conceptual structures or frameworks are the individual’s 
solatium to the problem, but it is his use of such formulations in seeing 
the elements of the problem in the needed way which is his understanding.
An important point to be emphasised here is that these latter, uniquely 
human understandings are communicable. Han’s symbolic tools, to use
15K. Duncker, ”0n Problem-Solving,” following C. Osgood’s discus­
sion in . . . Experimental Psychology. 626-627.
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Hawkins* phraseology, are truly "tools to make tools"; with them there is 
theoretically no limit to the conceptual power man*3 thought is capable 
of reaching. This is because with symbolic thought there has been a con­
comitant creation, the ability to communicate abstract thoughts. Cultur­
al advance stems from the creative genius of individuals who build in 
their turn upon the creative genius of the individuals who have preceded 
them. The communicative nature of symbolic thought lies in the fact that, 
to say something is not necessarily to "know it," but to "know something*’ 
symbolically requires being able to say it. Or, to put the same point in 
terms of the Issues as presented by Carroll, the farmer who uses a crow­
bar as a lever does not have the concept "lever” unless he is able to dis­
cuss his behavior in terms of fulcrums, equal moments, etc. or some sym­
bolic equivalents thereof.
At this point and before continuing, it might be well to briefly 
recapitulate what has been covered thus far. Through a discussion of the 
process of discovery in science and the processes of one type of human 
problem solving, we have pursued the notion that the attained understand­
ings in the two cases, i.e., scientific and ordinary human understandings, 
are of essentially the same nature, a "way of seeing things.” While striv­
ing to express their similarities, however, attention must also be given 
to differences in the ways such understandings are held (i.e., used) in 
the two cases. As was noted earlier, there is a great deal of difference 
in the "level of reality” attributed to what amounts to working formula­
tions by scientists on the one hand and people in their everyday lives 
on the other. We have already seen in the discussion of scientific dis­
covery that the scientist is very sophisticated in his understanding of
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possible relations between his theories and observational facts. Part of 
the following sections of this chapter will be devoted to making the above 
point clearer.
The Relation Between Theory and Fact for the Scientist 
To think about the world theoretically is almost by definition not 
to confront it directly. A theoretical approach is just that, a symboli­
cally mediated approach to the world, and, in terms of that approach the 
world is treated "as if" it conformed to our theoretical formulations of 
it. We might say that the role of theories in science is that of a work­
ing conceptual framework whieh allows us to orient ourselves within the 
activity of investigating nature. An example provided by Toulmin is use­
ful here. For some purposes it is useful to the scientist to think of a 
cylinder of hydrogen gas "as if" it were a box of fast-moving billiard 
balls. We arie quite right in supposing that the scientist does not really 
think that a cylinder of gas is a box of fast-moving billiard balls; he 
does not. It is the relevant properties of the analogy that give its 
usage a functional utility. That is, for purposes of treating the sub­
ject he has found it useful to think of the cylinder of gas in this fash­
ion.13
Another example of the way the scientists notions are related to 
fact is provided by the concept of absolute zero, also discussed by 
Toulmin. As he points out, the presence of an absolute zero of tempera­
ture might at first appear as a "strange and ineluctable fact about the
1Auniverse;" the point beyond which it is impossible to go. However, as
13Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science. 165-167* ~̂Ibid.. 129-133*
-51-
he later makes clear,
The existence, at some point, of an absolute zero of tempera­
ture is not a brute fact at all, but a conceptual matter— i.e.,
. a consequence of the way we give meaning to the notion of temp­
erature, and put degrees of warmth and cold into relation with 
the number series. '
The notion of absolute zero is found to be a logical consequence of the 
introduction of the concept of an ideal gas, and with it, an aligning of 
numbers in an ideal gas scale of temperature such that numbers below 
-273*16° G have no interpretation as temperatures. The current techno­
logical fact that no temperatures lower than the physicist* s "absolute 
zero” have been reached might be taken as confirming evidence for the 
efficacy of his way of looking at things. However, the physicist suffers 
from no delusions that his concept represents a "brute fact" of nature.
It is probably true that the present line of reasoning could be carried 
too far. Certainly it is true that if the scientist did not in fact at­
tribute a great deal of meaningfulness and significance to his theoreti­
cal formulations he would quite reasonably feel he was wasting his time. 
The confirming evidence of his predictions, for one thing, give him cause 
to think that he is making statements, however indirect, about the world 
of fact. The point being made is that he does realize that his statements 
are indirect, that he is treating the world in an "as if" fashion. He is 
aware that he is not simply talking about "the way things are." And on 
this note let us turn to what correspondes to the scientist*s body of 
theories, the person*s everyday understanding of things and events, or, 
more generally, simply one* s beliefs.
15Ibid. l6Ibid.
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Eve ryd ay Understanding 
As Kenneth Boulding sets forth the nature of everyday understand­
ing,̂  ̂it has the character of a psychological system. It is a composite 
of many conceptually structured understandings as they have been discus­
sed thus far— though much of it has not been given explicit symbolic form­
ulation. That is, the kind of understanding previously discussed should 
be thought of as a portion of an individuals total understanding which 
has been given explicit symbolic expression.. To use Church’s terms, con­
ceptually structured understandings are symbolically formulated portions 
of larger schematic frameworks.
Boulding further elaborates his conception of a person’s total 
understanding as an orientation to the world as experienced in terms of
space and time, a system of inter-personal roles, and a knowledge of "how 
1 8things operate." Finally, Boulding stresses the fact that everything
in a person’s total understanding is, in varying degrees, valuatively
assessed.
Boulding begins:
As I sit at my desk, I know where I am. I see before me a 
window; beyond that some trees; beyond that the red roofs of 
the campus of Stanford University; beyond them, the trees and 
roof tops which make up the town of Palo Alto. 9
He goes on to develop his spatial understanding of things as containing
a conception of the location of the state of California with relation to
the rest of the United States, of the United States, in turn, with rela-
17Boulding, The Image. Boulding’s term for what in these pages is 
referred to as the person’s "total understanding** is "the image."
18Ibid.. 5. 19Ibid.. 4.
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tion to the rest of the world. The world is visualized as a globe, which,
within another formulation of things, is seen as a tiny speck "circling
around a bright star which is the sun, in company with many other similar
20specks, the planets."
He continues,
I know that I came to California about a year ago, and I am 
leaving it in about three weeks. I know that I have lived in 
a number of different places at different times. I know that 
about ten years ago a great war came to an end, that about 
forty years ago another great war came to an end. Certain 
dates are meaningful: 1776, 1620, 1066. I have a picture in 
my mind of the formation of the earth, of the long history of 
geological time, of the brief history of man. The great civil­
izations pass before my mental screen. Many of the images are 
vague, but Greece follows Crete, Rome follows Assyria.2-*-
We have traced Boulding!s conception of his own understanding far 
enough to gain support for our composite characterization of it. His 
spatial understanding is something composed of many sub-understandings.
In turn, his spatial understanding is but a part of his total understand­
ing, his total conception of his "place” in the world.
This composite nature of each of the sub-understandings is perhaps 
most clearly illustrated in Boulding*s description of his "place" in time. 
Some of the parts of his conception of time have their sources in personal 
experience, but the bulk is a culturally transmitted heritage. The dates 
1776, 1620 and 1066 probably gained their meaningfulness through courses 
in American and British history. The conceptions of the "long history of 
geological time" and the "brief history of man" could have come from a 
course in physical anthropology, while the sequence of Greece following 
Crete, etc., could have com from the study of ancient history.
To continue with Boulding*s description of the adult*s world view,
2°Ibid. ' 2lIbid.
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we might not® his first two um^or propositions: a) that behavior depends
on individual understanding, and b) that "the meaning of a message is the
change which it produces" in an individual1s understanding of himself,
22things, and events. The first conforms to the social psychologist’s 
notion that what a man does depends upon how he defines the situation he 
is in. The second conformsto the present use of meaning to the effect 
that the meaning of a communicated message is the change which it produces 
in the psychological system of the receiver.
As Boulding sets forth the nature of man’s interaction with the 
world, there are five things which may happen when a message is received.
It may go right through, i.e.-, it may be ignored; it may change a person’s 
conceptions in some well-defined way, as, for example, the oceurance of 
an expected event; it may cause a reorganization of the person’s under­
standing (Boulding’s example for this is religious conversion); it may 
cause an effect of adding to or clarifying some part of his understanding; 
and finally, it may cause doubt or uncertainty to be introduced into his 
understanding.
All of these possible effects of messages are of interest and all 
are, in varying degrees, in conformity with the presently advocated view 
of communication as resulting in a reorganization of a person’s psycholog­
ical system of understandings. However, the third and forth effects (i.e., 
reorganizing understanding and adding to or clarifying understanding) are 
of particular interest with regard to the present interest in communica­
tions for these are particularly amenable to interpretation in terms of 
the transfer of understandings via the communication of conceptual
22Ibid.. 6.
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frameworks. Boulding* s views on the effects of messages is something that 
will be returned to and used in a later attempt to fit some of the notions 
explored in this and the previous chapters together into a composite view 
of the communication process. Before doing that, however, there are a few 
more ideas that will be needed and that are contained in Church’s treat­
ment of the adult’s world view.
The Symbolic Processing of Schemata 
In this section we will return to Church’s discussion of-: schema­
tized experience, at this time concentrating upon his discussion of the
individual’s process of treating these schematized notions of the world 
23symbolically. Church’s conception of this process is the recasting of 
schematized experience into verbal structures that are symbolically under­
standable.^
We have noted earlier that thd: child first schematizes space prag­
matically in terms of direct experience. What is happening can be thought 
of as a process wherein the objects of perception experienced directly 
are sorted out and fitted into a perceptually meaningful field of action. 
The resulting field of action is a schema. When this schema is symboli­
cally processed there is the creation of a symbolic space, ii®., space is 
no longer confronted directly but is treated in terms of symbolically con­
ceptualized notions of space.
A thought from Cassirer is helpful in distinguishing between space 
experienced as a field of action and symbolic, conceptualized space. He
23church’s term for the symbolic treatment of previously schema­
tized experience is "thematization.”
^Church, 97.
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uses the example of the savage who might know every crook and turn of a 
river, every rock and shoal and rapid. Yet, if asked to give a symbolic 
representation of his knowledge, i.e., a map, he would be completely at a 
loss. It is not that he is not in possession of all of the facts necessary 
to the completion of an accurate mapj he simply never has represented these 
facts to himself or to anyone else except as a succession of direct experi­
ences. He could sit and tell successively every turn to be expected in 
navigating the river so that someone listening to him, who did represent 
his space symbolically, could draw a fairly accurate nap from his succes­
sive description, but for him it would remain a sequence of direct experi- 
25 !ences.
Returning to Church* s exposition, the five-year-old has a very
accurate conception of how the house he lives in is constructed, but the
picture he would draw of it would reflect, not how the house is actually
26constructed nearly so much as the way he has experienced it. With the 
acquisition of language and the mastery of this mode of expression, there 
comes the concomitant ability to give a symbolic representation of per­
ceptually experienced space— in accordance with symbolically learned rules 
of representation.
In chruch*s discussion of the symbolic processing of experience, 
there is also an element of what Cassirer (and to some extent Hawkins) has 
referred to as the development of a symbolic dimension of reality.
In our society, the children of symbol-minded parents quickly 
pick up styles of analytical, logical, playful, critical lan­
guage and begin the slow and painful but rewarding venture of 
working and reworking their experience symbolically until they
25 9 /Cassirer, Essay. 44-46. °Church, 8.
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have achieved rational thought. In so doing, the individ­
ual carries a step further the evolutionary internalization, 
of the environment: he internalizes it symbolically and can 
carry his experience around with him.'
Church sounds a note very remindful of Cassirer when he writes,
In verbalizing reality, we make explicit the properties of 
and the connections between things, properties and connec­
tions which were only dynamistically implicit or wholly hid­
den. Once language has called our attention ... to prev­
iously latent features of the landscape, they remain perman­
ently accessible to us.2®
The discussion by Church of the individuals symbolic treatment of 
his implicitly understood, schematically ordered experience into symboli­
cally represented, conceptually structured knowledge that is permanently 
accessible to consciousness concludes our discussion of what is communi­
cated. In the following chapter, attention will be turned to a discussion 
of some notions on the subject of how it might be communicated.
27Ibid.. 10?. 28Ibid.. 107-108
CHAPTER FIVE
THE COMMUNICATION OF CONCEPTUALLY STRUCTURED 
UNDERSTANDINGS
It is the purpose of this last chapter to return to and in some 
ways expand upon the conception of communication put forward in the intro­
duction. Thus advantage can be taken of insights gained through the pre­
ceding discussions of the nature of conceptually structured understand­
ings. It should perhaps be noted before beginning this last discussion 
that no pretense is made of answering all of the questions or even of con­
sidering all of the problems raised by such an inquiry as has been under­
taken in these pages. Full consideration of how understandings as we have 
discussed them are communicated would most properly be subject of another 
study, perhaps even greater in length than the present one. In short 
then, what follows are some thoughts about the process of communicating 
a system of ordered symbolic concepts.
To begin with it might be well to emphasize again a distinction be­
tween understandings and conceptual frameworks made in the introduction. 
"Understanding” should not be regarded as synonymous with "conceptual 
framework” but rather as the use of same. Thus the message content em­
bodies a conceptual framework which the receiver, in comprehending its 
structure and the symbolic meaning contents within it, gains the use of 
on his own behalf. The present consideration of the process of communi­
cating conceptual understandings then, places special emphasis on the
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activities of the receiver in inferring the other person’s understanding. 
Me does this by conpreheading the conceptual framework embodied in the 
messages he receives.-*-
The process as thus far described conforms to a view of communica­
tion advanced by Boulding. Its view of communication is the inferring of
the understandings of the world ”which are possessed by those around us
2from the messages they transmit to us.” Unfortunately Boulding does not 
elaborate upon this conception. However, taken together with his discus­
sion of the possible effects of messages, it is still capable of being 
expounded more fully. One such effeet that was singled out earlier for 
later discussion at this time was that of adding to, clarifying, and thus 
causing a reorganization of understanding. The view that communication 
can result in a reorganization of a structured understanding conforms 
quite well with the view of the process indicated above. What needs to 
be added to make it conform completely is to say that it is the utiliza­
tion of a conceptual framework which reorganizes understanding. In both 
cases it is possible to say that to the extent that the receiver’s con­
ceptions of the world are restructured, or are capable of being restruc­
tured, by virtu© of having correctly inferred the understanding of things 
held by the transmitter, then, to that extent communication has taken 
place.
course this process is aided by the simultaneous communication 
of meanings via gestures, inflection, tone, etc., but this aspect of the 
process is a subject that has received considerable attention elsewhere 
and will not be gone into here.
B̂oulding, 1?.
To continue, it might be noted that our discussions of the nature 
of understandings has provided some views on the question of how messages 
com® to be formulated. Here the reader is referred to two previous dis­
cussions: first to the discussion of problem solving leading up to the 
assertion that to understand something symbolically requires being able 
to symbolically express it, and second to the discussion of the symbolic 
processing of schematized experience by Church. The point of these dis­
cussions might be summed up as follows: the very act of symbolically un­
derstanding something entails the formulation of a conceptual framework 
which symbolically expresses it.
The above conception of the role which the nature of understand­
ings plays in the formation of messages is given explicit expression by 
Church. According to Church, when one person speaks, he verbalizes a 
portion of schematic framework. His verbalizations should therefore be 
regarded as both a formulation of his thoughts and as the transmitted 
message. A listener, on the other hand, "puts on” the schema of the speak­
er, and, in efforts to express its lack of congruence with his own, puts 
forward his own verbal formulations with regard to the subject. One per­
son begins to verbalize his attitudes and the other chimes in with his
own elaborations, corrections, objections, or alternative symbolic forma­
'slations of the subject.-'
A further aspect of communication, as Church discusses it, arises 
through the fact that symbolically formulated schemata are only portions 
of larger schematic formulations, not all of which have been made explicit 
through being treated symbolically. If the subject is one not previously
Ĉhurch, 129-131.
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thought out by the speaker, large parts of it nay be only implicitly sche­
matized at the start of the conversation. In the course of formulating 
his thoughts what was only implicit becomes explicit. If the subject is 
a familiar one,of course, then his verbalizations are actually those of an 
already symbolically structured schema and his speech flows out as a fluent 
expression of a well-thought-out position.4
Whether communication has occurred, of course, depends only in part 
upon the fact than an understanding has been given verbal expression. As 
noted before, only in so far as the process results in possibilities for 
a restructured understanding on the part of the receiver can we say that 
communication has taken place. Church1s treatment of the subject provides 
some further thoughts on how messages might come to be formulated and ex­
pressed. However, with regard to the problem of how they might be infer­
red, there is nothing more in his account than a statement that, in some 
manner, the listener Mputs onM the schema of the speaker.
In considering the possible nature of this inferring process on the 
part of the receiver, it might be well to look for clues as to how it pro­
ceeds in the discussion of symbolic understandings. It is possible that 
the very thing that makes them capable of being given symbolic expression 
also provides the means by which they are inferred, namely the fact that 
they consist in the use of conceptual frameworks. Viewed in this way, the 
problem seems to amount to answering the following questions what is there 
about linguistically expressed conceptual frameworks that renders them 
capable of being comprehended'— i.e., incorporated into an understanding?
One answer to the above question might be that an expressed
4Ibid.
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conceptual framework is very readily and naturally apprehended, by virtue 
of the fact that it is structured in accordance with the same rules by 
which human thought is structured. This answer is supported by a widely 
held conception of human, symbolic thought in the social sciences, that 
it is the exact counterpart of normal human speech.
To say that the structure of conceptual frameworks, as they have 
been previously discussed, conforms to the rules of grammatical expression 
in no way conflicts with anything that was said conderning their structure. 
Before it was discussed as a relational “way of seeing things'1 in a mean­
ingful configuration. low the fact is simply added that, in achieving 
coherent expression, these configurations must be structured in accordance 
with the rules of grammar. The vast topic of the restrictions imposed on 
conceptual thought by our grammar, with its sharp distinctions between 
things (named by nouns), their properties (adjectives), etc., cannot be 
discussed here. Grammer is too large a subject to discuss either the re­
strictions it inposes or the extent to which these restrictions are remov­
ed or altered by languages constructed for that purpose, e.g., symbolic 
logic and mathematical languages. Emphasis here is rather on the positive, 
structural function which grammar plays in thought and speech.
To return to the discussion of what is involved in the receiver* s 
process of inferring someone*s understanding, the above considerations 
would seem to lend themselves to support a case for its being accomplished 
in the following manner. In symbolically formulating his thoughts, a 
speaker is actually doing not one but two things. He is expressing sym­
bolic meaning contents and at the same time exhibiting grammatically and 
syntactically how they fit together.
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To speak of "exhibited structure” in human discourse might strike 
one as a bit odd. let it amounts to little more than saying that a mean­
ingful configuration of concepts is as meaningful when given ordered ex­
pression by someone else as when it is formulated in one’s own thought—  
with one difference. Thought is generally without commitment and conforms 
with one*s value structure. Understanding the verbal output of someone 
else very often is lacking in one or both of these qualities. But this 
possible source of resistance to understanding is at least not directly 
related to comprehending the meaning of the terms used. Such valuative, 
persuasive aspects of the problem go beyond present interests and need 
not concern us here. For present purposes it is enough to say that there 
is a perceivable structure as well as symbolic meaning contents in the 
use of language. It might be possible to conceive of such perceivable 
structure as “instructions”: to a receiver as to how one1s thought is 
ordered. Or, eliminating the impression of intentional behavior on the 
part of a speaker, we might say that part of a person*s verbalizations 
could be logically construed as “instructions” to structure the symbolic 
meaning contents he is sending in a particular fashion.
The receiver’s inferring processes might be compared to the pro­
cesses involved in a problem solving situation of the type discussed be­
fore. In both cases a person is faced with the task of obtaining the use 
of a conceptual framework and with it an attained understanding. Still 
It mast be noticed that in the case of a receiver his attained understand­
ing could differ from that of the person he is trying to understand. But 
by gaining the use of the particular conceptual framework communicated,and 
with it gestural cues, he is able to infer the other’s understanding.
Perhaps now the reason for making the distinction between under­
standings and conceptual frameworks has become clear. Although both are 
to be thought of as mediating constructs, i.e., as "in” people, in the 
present formulation the former is inferred from the latter. Only the 
latter is a vehicle of communication. In the same way it was insisted 
that symbolic meanings are not to be found in the world (i.e., they too 
are mediating constructs). let the symbol proper is capable of being ex­
pressed even though its meaning is not. Thus it can serve as a vehicle 
of communication in a fashion completely analogous to that given as the
function of conceptual frameworks. In both cases their expression in
5messages serve to arouse meaningful responses in receiver’s.'
Of course the problem solving analogy has some limitations, and it 
might help clarify the present view ©f communication to point them out.
For one thing, in a problem solving situation, a person is attesting to 
formulate a conceptual structure. In a communication situation of the 
type under discussion, he is attempting to perceive a presented concept­
ual structure. Moreover, the processes of the latter situation are much 
less creative, much more automatic,than in the former situation— and this 
because the symbols he hears are already expressed in a meaningful config­
uration of relations. Yet there is a danger in carrying this present line 
of reasoning too far. If it is true that symbolic meanings take part of 
their meaning from and within the context in which they are used, then a 
receiver must to some extent be striving to ascertain what precise meaning
%he communication of symbolic meanings by evoking meaning responses 
in receivers is a very common conception of the process. Its use here is 
more one of illustration and example than any new use of the conception.
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a symbolic vehicle conveys within a particular conceptual framework. This 
after all was the point of emphasizing that the distinguishing character­
istic of symbolic meaning is not its explicitness of reference but its 
preciseness of meaning and the versatility it allows in using that mean­
ing. The precise meaning used is required to be comprehended by means
of the contextual realtions a symbolic vehicle has with a conceptual frame-
6work taken as a whole.
Although more could be said concerning the above conception of com­
munication (in the way of relating it specifically to the preceeding dis­
cussion of understanding), further attention should be given to the scope 
of communicative situations to which it is intended to apply. Indication 
has been given at times that what has been said of the communication of 
conceptually structured understandings is not so narrowly conceived that 
some things said of it could not also, in some ways, be applied to other 
types of communicative situations. However, the focus of the discussion 
has been intended to apply only to those somewhat ideal situations where­
in one person can be presumed to have a symbolically structured understand­
ing and the intent of communicating it to another individual. Also, under 
the ideal conditions intended to apply, it should be possible to assume 
that the receiver is making a real effort to understand: the speaker. Ex­
amples might be a teacher lecturing to a biology class on the subject of 
evolution or a history professor exploring causes for the First World
Ŝuch consideration of symbolic meanings in context, of course, 
in some way involves prediction of an unfolding context in an on-going 
discourse. Prediction of this type might be accounted for in terms of 
the redundancy of language, e.g., the likelyhood of occurrence of the 
next word in a sentence— or at least the next word type: noun, verb, ad­
jective, etc., as predictable from grammatical structure.
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War, etc.
Oddly enough we cannot include a mathematics or science teacher 
where their discourse might include the communication of mathematically 
structured conceptual frameworks. While we have used discussions from 
the philosophy of science throughout the present work, the treatment giv­
en to symbolic meanings has not included numerical concepts. Thus the 
present formulation of the nature of human understanding is not complete 
enough as it presently stands to apply to mathematical thought. To in 
any way deal adequately with understandings mediated by numerical con­
cepts would require a detailed discussion of such concepts.
Instead of doing this (since such a discussion would necessarily 
be rather long in length and in excess of present needs in discussing 
the nature of conceptually structured understandings), something of the 
opposite approach was taken. Use was made of work already done along 
lines of explaining the nature of scientific understanding in applying it 
to the problem of obtaining a workable conception of everyday understand­
ing. Fortunately, however, most of what would be needed in the way of 
explicating the nature of mathematical understandings has already been 
done by Cassirer and Hawkins. It therefore seems reasonable to assume 
that, once the needed explication of numerical concepts was included, the 
above formulation could be extended to include the transfer of mathemati­
cal conceptual structures as well.
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